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AbstrAct
The member States of Mercosur are currently 
negotiating a Trade Agreement with the EU, 
as part of the process towards a comprehensive 
bi-regional Association Agreement. In 2016, 
the EU and Mercosur members exchanged 
offers, followed by a negotiation round. The 
next round will be held in October 2017; while 
awaiting for political developments, it is worth 
anticipating some challenges to come, espe-
cially from a legal perspective. Both actors have 
a multilayered system for decision-making, 
requiring the consensus of a multiplicity of 
governmental actors and thus enabling them 
to convey. Furthermore, current dialogues 
consider a broad range of issues, which were 
also covered by different EU’s agreements with 
other trading partners. These agreements re-
ceived critiques from the civil society, which 
are worth to reflect upon, considering that the 
trade agreement is due to impact the general 
negotiation for the bi-regional Association 
Agreement. The paper develops this reflec-
tion from a twofold perspective: that of the 
institutional nature of EU and Mercosur and 
that of the democratic deficit in the overall 
negotiation process.
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unión europea y mercosur vis 




Los Estados miembros de Mercosur están ac-
tualmente negociando un acuerdo comercial 
con la Unión Europea, como parte del proce-
so hacia la integración comercial birregional. 
En 2016, la Unión Europea y el Mercosur 
intercambiaron ofertas, luego de unas rondas 
de negociación. La siguiente cita es en 2017, 
mientras que se esperan algunos cambios po-
líticos, en especial, desde la perspectiva legal. 
Además, ambos actores tienen que agotar un 
número de etapas para la toma de decisiones, 
entre las cuales se encuentra el consenso de 
los actores gubernamentales y la determina-
ción de sus competencias. Ahora, los diálogos 
actuales requieren resolver una amplia gama 
de cuestiones que estaban ya debatidas por 
distintos acuerdos firmados por la Unión 
Europea con otros socios comerciales. Tales 
acuerdos deberían ser tenidos en cuenta en el 
proceso de negociación entre la Unión Europea 
y Mercosur. El presente artículo desarrolla esta 
última reflexión desde dos puntos de vista: por 
una parte, el carácter institucional de la Unión 
Europea y el Mercosur; por otra, el déficit de-
mocrático en el proceso general de negociación 
entre los actores.
Palabras clave: Unión Europea, Mercosur, 
acuerdo comercial, instituciones, omc, Estado, 
sociedad civil.
the eu - mercosur InstItutIonAl 
relAtIonshIp In trAde
Since 1995, Mercosur-EU relations have 
been guided by the Framework Cooperation 
Agreement, signed on 15 December 1995 
and fully in force as of 1 July 19991. In ad-
dition, some individual Mercosur countries 
(more specifically, Paraguay2, Uruguay3 and 
Argentina4) have in place bilateral Framework 
Cooperation Agreements with the EU, which 
also establish a structure for dealing with trade-
related matters. 
The objective of these instruments was 
to create a framework for negotiations on an 
1 Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, 
of the one part, and the Southern Common Market and its Party States, of the other part. Signed on December 15th, 
1995 and entered into force on July 1st 1999. OJ L69, 19/03/1996, p. 4.
2 Framework Agreement for cooperation between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Para-
guay, entered into force on 30th October 1992.
3 Framework Agreement for cooperation between the European Economic Community and the Eastern Republic 
of Uruguay - Exchange of Letters Signed on November the 4th 1991 and entered into force on January 1st 1994. OJ 
L94, 08/04/1992, p. 2.
4  Framework Agreement for trade and economic cooperation between the European Economic Community and 
the Argentine Republic - Exchange of Letters, OJ L 295, 26.10.1990, p. 67-73.
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Interregional Association Agreement, which 
would ideally include full liberalization of 
trade in goods and services in conformity with 
wto rules, enhanced forms of co-operation 
and strengthened political dialogue between 
Mercosur and the EU. More specifically, ne-
gotiators identified a dynamic strategy divided 
into two stages in order to achieve the conclu-
sion of the Interregional Association Agree-
ment. The first stage involves the conclusion 
of an Interregional Framework Agreement on 
trade and economic cooperation that would 
cover trade liberalization, support for the 
integration of Mercosur, enhancing dialogue 
and consultations between the parties at min-
isterial level on policy and cooperation issues 
of common interest. The second stage instead 
involves the creation of an interregional as-
sociation between the European Union and 
Mercosur, which is the long-term objective of 
the overall negotiation. The association would 
ideally be based on a balanced and mutual 
partnership at political, economic and com-
mercial level. It should be aimed at promoting 
an increase in interregional trade of mutual 
benefit, increasing investment for foreign com-
panies, strengthening political cooperation at 
international level, in particular by adopting 
common positions in international bodies on 
issues of mutual interest. In other words, the 
central aspects of the association would be the 
liberalization of trade, services and capital, 
embedded in a wider framework of political 
and institutional coordination within (but not 
limited to) international fora. These being the 
goals currently pursued at the high policy level, 
the reality is instead rather less ambitious.
As a matter of definitions, in EU’s legal 
lexicon, an Interregional Association Agree-
ment (iaa) is an “international agreement 
that the EU has concluded with third […] 
blocs (of States) with the aim of setting up an 
all-embracing framework to conduct bilateral 
relations”. Differently, a Free Trade Agreement 
(fta) is an “agreement in which both parties 
agree to trade freely with one another without 
imposing tariffs” (European Union External 
Action Service, 2011). The scope of an iaa is 
therefore much wider than an fta’s. In such a 
framework, it is possible that a “trade chapter” 
of an iaa transforms in an autonomous fta 
(and vice versa an fta is converted in a chap-
ter of an iaa) according to the smoothness of 
negotiations in one field or another. 
The Mercosur countries form a free trade 
area and an increasingly integrated market of 
250 million consumers5. They also generate 
together the fifth largest gdp in the world. In 
5 For the four Mercosur countries negotiating with the EU, the EU is Mercosur’s first trading partner, accounting 
for 21% of the bloc’s total trade in 2015. The EU’s exports to the region have increased from €21 billion in 2005 to 
€46 billion in 2015. Mercosur’s exports have increased from €32 billion to €42 billion over the same period. Merco-
sur’s biggest exports to the EU in 2015 were agricultural products, such as foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco (24%), 
vegetable products including soya and coffee (18%) and meats and other animal products (6%). Other exports in-
clude mineral products (14%), wood and paper products (8%) and machinery (5%). The EU’s exports to Mercosur 
include machinery (29%), vehicles and parts (17% of total exports) and chemicals and pharmaceuticals (24%). The 
EU is also a major exporter of commercial services to Mercosur (€20 billion in 2014). The EU is the biggest foreign 
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2015, Mercosur was the tenth largest export 
market for the EU goods6. Mercosur and the 
EU began negotiations in order to put in place 
one of the building blocks of the iaa in April 
2000. In September 2004, both parties made 
available their market access offers. From that 
moment, several institutional and informal 
meetings and a prolonged stagnation took 
place7, up to May 2016, when negotiators met 
in Brussels to develop their offers on access to 
their respective markets of goods, services and 
government procurement. After this exchange, 
the tenth round of negotiations concluded in 
Brussels on October 2016 and we are now 
awaiting for the next one, which is going to 
take place in Brasilia between 2 and 6 Octo-
ber 20178. Three main principles govern the 
trade chapter negotiations (Hinojsa, 2009): i) 
a region-to-region (or bi-regional) approach, 
which constitutes the basis of discussions on 
all regulatory areas; ii) the agreement should 
be comprehensive and balanced, going beyond 
the respective obligations in wto. No sector 
should be excluded, while taking account of 
product sensitivities; iii) the agreement should 
constitute a single undertaking, implemented 
by the parties as an indivisible whole.
While negotiations were ongoing, all 
Mercosur countries, with the exception of 
Paraguay, were de-listed from the EU’s Gen-
eralized Scheme of Preferences (gsp), due to 
their classification as high middle-income 
countries. The gsp scheme is designed to allow 
developing countries to pay less or no duties 
investor in the region, rising from €130 billion in 2000 to €387 billion in 2014. Mercosur is a major investor in the 
EU, with stocks of €115 billion in 2014. Source: EU Commission, 2017.
6  Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with Mercosur Potential gains for the EU May 2016, available at http://
trade.ec.europa.eu.
7  On 04 May 2010 the European Commission decided to relaunch trade negotiations with Mercosur. Following 
the re-launch, the first round of negotiations was held from 29 June to 02 July 2010 in Buenos Aires. The second 
round took place in Brussels on 11-15 October, and the third round in Brasilia from 22 November to 07 Decem-
ber 2010. In February 2011 in Paraguay and Uruguay, MERCOSUR and EU met to advance their ongoing trade 
negotiations. The following rounds of negotiations took place on 14-18 March 2011 in Brussels and on 02-06 May 
2011 in Asunción, Paraguay. In In the context of the XXII Bi-Regional Negotiations Committee (BNC), delegations 
from MERCOSUR and the European Union held working meetings from July 4th to July 8th, 2011. The XXIII Bi-
Regional Negotiations Committee (BNC), took place from 7 to 11 November 2011. The eight round was held in the 
context of the XXIV meeting of the Bi-Regional Negotiations Committee (BNC), from 12 to 16 March 2012. In the 
framework of the XXV Bi-regional Negotiations Committee, delegates from MERCOSUR and the European Union 
met in Brasília from 22 to 26 October 2012 for the ninth round of MERCOSUR-EU negotiations. Delegates from 
MERCOSUR and the European Union met for a Ministerial Meeting in Santiago, Chile, on January 26, 2013. On 
24 February 2014, in the context of the Seventh Brazil-EU Summit, the Brazilian president indicates that a free trade 
deal between MERCOSUR and the EU is close to completion. On 11 June 2015, representatives from MERCOSUR 
and the European Union held a Ministerial Meeting in Brussels, Belgium.
8 The round should have taken place in March 2017, but was postponed. Yet, both blocs have made comments in 
recent weeks to the effect that a final deal will be announced in December 2017 at the World Trade Organisation’s 
11th ministerial conference in Buenos Aires.
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on their exports to the EU, in order to give 
them access to EU markets and contribute to 
mutual economic growth. As from 1 January 
2014, the EU’s reformed gsp scheme focuses 
support on developing countries most in 
need9. Mercosur’s member States remain to-
day gsp-eligible countries, an option that they 
would lose in the moment in which an fta 
(or a fortiori an iaa) enters into force, because 
the fta is incompatible with the application 
of the gsp scheme. From a trade perspective, 
failure to reach an agreement with the EU 
means that Mercosur countries would have to 
compete with other exporting countries that 
benefit from gsp scheme as well as those that 
have already an fta in place.
The exclusion of Mercosur’s members 
from the gsp scheme, previously allowing 
the same States to access EU’s market under 
privileged conditions, can represent a boost 
to negotiations. The conclusion of the fta 
would somehow resume preferential condi-
tions of trade between Mercosur’s States and 
the EU. Over the last round, negotiators cov-
ered a wide array of topics, such trade in goods; 
rules of origin; customs and trade facilitation 
(including mutual administrative assistance 
and anti-fraud clause); technical barriers to 
trade; sanitary and phytosanitary measures; 
trade defense instruments; subsidies; dispute 
settlement; services and establishment; public 
procurement; intellectual property (including 
geographical indicators); competition and 
State-owned enterprises. Some of the chapters 
proved to be particularly contentious, as for 
instance the parts relating to dispute settle-
ment mechanisms, public procurement and 
State-owned enterprise, due to the important 
reforms that their implementation imply in the 
very socio-economic structure of the relevant 
States. Overall, a trade agreement between 
the EU and Mercosur would help to reduce 
barriers to trade of any nature, allowing for a 
more fluid and efficient exchange of goods and 
services between the regions, since the reduc-
tion of tariffs remains the primary goal. The 
agreement would serve mainly to enhance pre-
existing ties and relations (such the Framework 
Cooperation Agreement of 1995) and provide 
for institutionalized forms of cooperation. The 
EU’s trade strategy paper (EU Commission, 
2015) identifies Mercosur as one of the priority 
areas for Europe’s regional trade negotiations 
(Malmström, 2017), based on the size of the 
Mercosur market and the potential for stimu-
lating inter-regional trade flows by removing 
market access obstacles10. 
Given the scope of the negotiations’ sub-
ject matter, it is impossible to cover it com-
prehensively herewith. The paper therefore 
explores some of the most challenging aspects 
of the agreement, assessing them against the 
backdrop of the advantages promised to both 
parties, bearing in mind that the fta is due 
9 Regulation (Eu) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 applying a 
scheme of generalised tariff preferences and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008.
10 According to data from the European Commission, in 2016 the EU exported goods to the Mercosur countries 
worth €43.2bn and imported €41.6bn. Source: Natalia Kidd, www.euractive.com.
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to impact on the overall negotiation for the 
iaa. The chosen aspects are, on the one hand, 
institutional (some would even say constitu-
tional) (De Wet, 2006) nature of the EU and 
Mercosur and, on the other hand, the argu-
ment of the democratic deficit in negotiations. 
Both aspects have been selected because of 
their ability to encompass several other more 
specific critiques, which cannot be dealt with 
at the present stage of negotiations11. 
In order to do so, the next section high-
lights some institutional aspects of the rel-
evant actors and their treaty-making law and 
practice, as prerequisites for the analysis that 
follows.
eu’s lAw And procedure for 
Agreements’ conclusIon
Understanding the EU’s law and practice in 
the negotiation and conclusion of ftas is es-
sential for the EU’s negotiating partners, who 
have often been puzzled by its decision-making 
complexity (Devuyst, 2013). In this vein, 
the section provides an overview of the EU’s 
inter-institutional and legal practice in the 
negotiation and conclusion of international 
trade agreements.
The EU pursues trade liberalization on 
three main axis: at multi- lateral level, within 
the wto system, at unilateral level, through the 
gsp and at bilateral or regional level, through 
the conclusion of trade agreements with single 
or groups of third countries (EU Commis-
sion, 2006). More recently, renewed emphasis 
was placed on the importance of the regional 
dimension, promoting the conclusion of 
comprehensive bilateral/regional ftas, which 
establish preferential free trade and investment 
“corridors” between the EU and its commercial 
partners (Cellerino, 2015), without -at the 
same time- denying the centrality of the mul-
tilateral system. The newly engineered ftas are 
ideally based on reciprocity, comprehensive in 
scope and aim at the highest possible degree of 
liberalization in most economic sectors.
Article 216, paragraph 1, of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union 
(tfeu) and Article 37 of the Treaty on the Eu-
ropean Union (teu) confer the EU with the 
power to conclude treaties, together with the 
relevant norms on substantive competences. 
The decisions on the mandate to negotiate, on 
the signing and on the conclusion of the agree-
ment are issued by the institution participated 
by representatives from each member State at 
ministerial level, the Council, according to 
Article 218 tfeu.
The role of European Parliament, which 
instead represents EU citizens, in this proce-
dure was strengthened by the 2009 reform: 
the range of cases in which the consent of the 
European Parliament is required has been wid-
ened12 and, in cases where consent is not neces-
sary, the European Parliament must always be 
consulted. The only agreements that are con-
11 As will be further developed infra, only very few documents have been released thus preventing a scientific ap-
proach to the actual subject matters covered by the fta.
12 Article 218, paragraph 6, subparagraph 2, lit. a, item v, tfeu.
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cluded without any obligatory participation of 
the European Parliament are those exclusively 
concerning the area of the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (‘cfsp’), whereas the rule 
according to which the European Parliament 
shall be immediately and fully informed at 
every stage of the procedure applies in all areas 
of EU law. 
The European Parliament’s opportu-
nity to intervene on the negotiation drafts of 
agreements is nevertheless constrained by the 
fact that it is only requested an approval or 
rejection of the text, without the possibility to 
amend the draft, proposed by the Commission 
and embedded in the mandate issued by the 
Council. This did not prevent the Parliament 
from refusing to approve international agree-
ments such the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (Baroncini, 2013) nor from chal-
lenging measures adopted without its neces-
sary involvement, considered as an ‘essential 
procedural requirement’13.
The failure to comply with an essential 
procedural requirement is sufficient to subject 
the decision that concludes the treaty to an-
nulment procedure14 and thus make the whole 
agreement void in the EU15. The same can be 
said with regard to the voting rule to be fol-
lowed at Council level. In general, the Coun-
cil adopts its decisions by qualified majority, 
upon the proposal of the negotiator, who is 
appointed by the Council itself. Unanimity is 
required if the agreement is an association16 or 
a cooperation17 one, or one with candidates for 
accession to the EU. Conversely, an fta lies on 
the procedural basis of common commercial 
policy and thus requires the mere majority 
of Council members18. This contributes to 
explaining the preference for concluding an 
agreement on the trade, under the qualified 
majority rule before progressing toward the 
iaa, which instead requires unanimous consent 
among States’ representatives at Council level. 
According to this brief recap of how agree-
ments are concluded, it is apparent that EU 
citizens’ involvement in this activity is to some 
extent granted via the parliamentary scrutiny 
on the conclusion of international agreements. 
Nevertheless, as will be shown in section 4, 
civil society inclusion in international trade 
agenda is a rather edgy topic.
The EU can conclude agreements with 
one or more third countries or international 
organizations in a potentially extremely wide 
array of subject matters, having as a principal 
limit the principle of conferral19 and the divi-
13 ecj Case C-658/11, European Parliament v Council of the European Union, [2014], ecli:EU:C:2014:2025, par. 86.
14 Article 263 tfue.
15  Article 264, paragraph 1, tfeu.
16 Article 217 tfeu.
17 Article 212 tfeu.
18 Article 207 tfeu.
19 The principle of conferral is a fundamental principle of European Union law. According to this principle, the EU 
is a union of member states, and all its competences are voluntarily conferred on it by its member states. The EU has 
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sion of competence with member States20. 
The 2009 treaty reform qualifies the nature 
of common commercial policy (Bungenberg 
& Herrmann, 2013) by listing it among the 
a priori exclusive competences of the Union. 
The tfue clarifies the scope of such compe-
tence as including: tariff rates, the conclusion 
of agreements relating to trade in goods and 
services, the commercial aspects of intellec-
tual property, foreign direct investment, the 
achievement of uniformity in measures of 
liberalization, export policy and measures to 
protect trade such as those to be taken in the 
event of dumping or subsidies (Koutrakos, 
2008). Member States are therefore precluded 
from the exercise of external competences as 
regards international trade matters with the 
exception of the transport sector21.
Whenever a trade agreement also con-
tains provisions belonging to competences 
shared between the EU and its members, it is 
concluded as a mixed agreement. In the case 
of agreements falling under the exclusive com-
petence of the EU, the Council’s decision so 
providing is sufficient to ensure the entry into 
force of the agreement, both in the EU’s and 
member States’ legal orders. Conversely, EU 
member States must conclude and implement 
the portions of mixed agreements falling under 
their own competence, in accordance with 
their relevant domestic procedures. 
It is worth recalling that mixity —in the 
framework of agreements conclusion— is the 
most common situation; therefore, the num-
ber of cases in which the EU is alone on the 
negotiation table and, later, as a party to agree-
ments, is relatively small. Mixity represents an 
element of complexity in EU’s multilayered 
legal system that cannot be disregarded: on 
the one hand, it implies that agreements must 
be negotiated among 28 member States22,
the EU and the international partner(s). On the
no competences by right, and thus any areas of policy not explicitly agreed in treaties by all member states remain the 
domain of the member states. It is spelled out fully in Articles 4 and 5 of the teu.
20  These competences are divided into 3 main categories: exclusive competences; shared competences; and supporting 
competences. There are main types of competences. Exclusive competences (Article 3 tfeu) in which the EU alone 
is able to legislate and adopt binding acts. EU countries are able to do so themselves only if empowered by the EU to 
implement these acts. The EU have exclusive competence in the following areas: customs union; the establishing of 
competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market; monetary policy for euro area countries; con-
servation of marine biological resources under the common fisheries policy; common commercial policy; conclusion 
of international agreements under certain conditions. Shared competences (Article 4 tfeu): the EU and EU countries 
are able to legislate and adopt legally binding acts. EU countries exercise their own competence where the EU does 
not exercise, or has decided not to exercise, its own competence. Supporting competences (Article 6 of the tfeu): the 
EU can only intervene to support, coordinate or complement the action of EU countries. Legally binding EU acts 
must not require the harmonisation of EU countries’ laws or regulations.
21 Article 207, par. 5 tfeu.
22  Brexit seems to have little to no impact over the EU-Mercosur negotiations, as confirmed by Argentina’s foreign 
minister who said that she believes “once the dust settles” from Brexit, the EU-Mercosur negotiations will “emerge 
stronger”. Source: Euroefe.es (last visited 12 September 2017). Argentine Commerce Secretary Miguel Braun stated 
that “the UK is still part of the EU, and we are still negotiating with all the EU. Brexit would reduce the size of the 
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other hand, it also means that, once adopted, 
the agreement needs to be implemented at 
domestic level in numerous legal orders, where 
different procedures exist for implementation 
of international agreements. This aspect will 
be developed in Section 4.
mercosur’s InstItutIonAl 
settIng And conclusIon of 
InternAtIonAl Agreements
The Protocol of Ouro Preto gave Mercosur a 
legal personality under public international 
law23, with implications both internally and 
internationally24. The same Protocol also 
authorizes Mercosur to conclude headquarters 
agreements, as well as to negotiate and sign 
agreements with third States, groups of States 
and international organizations25.
A particular feature of Mercosur, despite 
it being an international organization, is that 
its founding member States did not transfer 
any part of their sovereignty to it. Conse-
quently, its institutions have no supranational 
authority: Mercosur’s institutions – Council 
of the Common Market, Common Market 
Group and Trade Commission – are of an 
intergovernmental nature26, as they are com-
posed of representatives of each member and 
decisions must be taken by consensus. The 
negotiation and conclusion of treaties require 
the participation of all Mercosur members. 
Agreements entered into by Mercosur are not 
directly applicable in the territory of its mem-
bers; they require ratification and implemen-
tation at the national level by each member: 
once a decision has been adopted, the members 
take the necessary measures to incorporate it 
into their domestic legislation. The constitu-
tions of founding member States establish that 
constitutional provisions take precedence over 
international law—as treaties concluded by 
Mercosur are. As regards the relation between 
international law and domestic law, things are 
more complex: while the constitutions of Ar-
gentina and Paraguay expressly lay down the 
prevalence of international treaties, in Brazil 
and Uruguay the hierarchy is determined 
by the rules of lex posterior and lex specialis 
(Schmidt, 2014). Similarly to parts of the fta 
falling under EU member States’ competence, 
the agreement, once adopted, will undergo a 
complex implementation phase in all involved 
legal orders, under different procedures.
Among the common trade policies of 
Mercosur only the common external tariff, 
an exceptions list and a customs regime have 
been established so far. These factors might 
market, there are some challenges to be addressed. At the same time we are open to discuss future potential trade deals 
with the UK”.There seem to be some space for bilateral negotiations between Mercosur countries and the Uk, once 
the Brexit procedures will be completed.
23 Article 34, Protocol of Ouro Preto (‘pop’).
24 Article 35, pop
25 Article 8, iv, pop.
26 See Section 4.A.
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eventually jeopardize the prompt entry into 
force of the document and possibly discourage 
negotiators in the attempt of reaching a shared 
consensus on the draft. Nevertheless, in June 
1996, Mercosur signed an fta with Chile and 
Bolivia, in 2005 with Colombia and Ecuador 
and in 2006 with Peru, thereby enhancing the 
organization’s expertise in drafting and imple-
mentation of ftas. Mercosur also has a strate-
gic interest in negotiations with the EU due 
to its own legitimation as a viable economic 
partner, due to the fact that the latter has been 
often questioned (Gomez Lehay, 2015).
Beside the mentioned decision-making 
bodies, three advisory bodies exist: i) the Sec-
retariat; ii) the Socio-Economic forum and 
iii) the Parliament. With specific regard to the 
latter, at the xxvii Meeting of Mercosur Heads 
of State in 2004, the Common Market Group 
instructed an ad hoc commission to write a pro-
tocol establishing a Parliament for Mercosur. 
In 2005, the presidents of Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay and Uruguay signed the Constitutive 
Protocol of the Mercosur Parliament27, creat-
ing the new body. The Parliament principal 
functions lie in the protection of democracy 
and human rights in the member States and in 
stimulating the integration process28. It should 
also develop opinions on draft standards re-
quiring legislative approval by member States. 
With regard to domestic procedures for incor-
poration of Mercosur law, after the decision-
making bodies adopted any regulation, the 
Parliament can only urge national authorities 
to adopt the necessary steps or to establish a 
preferential procedure for the treatment of 
Mercosur standards. However, decision-mak-
ing bodies are not obliged to comply with the 
parliamentary opinion, being able to adopt the 
legislation without it being in conformity with 
parliamentary advice (Cabrol, 2011).
The following section develops some re-
flections on challenges that could hinder the 
agreement’s conclusion, at first, and then its 
smooth implementation from the perspec-
tive of the institutional framework in which 
negotiations unfold.
InstItutIonAl chAllenges
After nearly ten years of EU-Mercosur negotia-
tions, it should be possible to identify lessons to 
be learned and provide some hints for the nego-
tiations to come. First, as emerges from previous 
27 cmc/Dec n. 23/05.
28 Art. 4, par. 12 of the Protocol states that: “El Parlamento elaborará dictámenes sobre proyectos de normas del 
mercosur que requieran aprobación legislativa en los Estados parte, en un plazo de noventa días (90). Estos proyectos 
son enviados al Parlamento por el órgano decisorio del mercosur, antes de su aprobación. Si el proyecto de norma 
es aprobado por el órgano decisorio, em concordância con el dictamen del Parlamento, la norma deberá ser remitida 
por cada Poder Ejecutivo nacional a su respectivo parlamento dentro del plazo de cuarenta y cinco (45) días. Si la 
norma no concuerda con el dictamen del Parlamento, o si no es expedida en el plazo requerido, ésta seguirá su trámite 
ordinario de incorporación. Los Parlamentos nacionales, según el cuerpo normativo de cada país, deberá adoptar las 
medidas necesarias para la instrumentación de las normas del mercosur que hayan sido adoptadas em concordancia 
con el dictamen del Parlamento. El plazo máximo de duración del procedimiento preferencial será de hasta ciento 
ochenta (180) días corridos a partir del ingreso del proyecto de norma al Parlamento nacional”.
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Sections, a very wide number of actors currently 
participate in the FTA’s making, whose strategic 
interests might collide. In the case of reaching 
the final stage, the agreement is deemed to be 
enacted by 5 plus 28 (27) States and the EU as 
such, with different constitutional procedures 
for the implementation of international law. The 
hyper-complexity of both the EU and Mercosur 
does not represent a benefit for the negotiations.
In retrospect, the failure to set a deadline 
for conclusion of negotiations, which arose 
from the EU’s insistence on subordinating 
negotiations to the wto negotiations, con-
tributed to prolonging the process. In this 
regard, the participation of the EU in the legal 
framework deriving from the wto agreements 
is particularly explanatory. When the Com-
munity was originally established, the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (‘gatt’) had 
been in place for about ten years. States today 
members of the EU were therefore bound by 
it when they concluded the Treaty of Rome 
establishing the European Economic Commu-
nity and desired to observe the undertakings 
provided for by gatt. Therefore, they made 
sure rights and obligations arising from agree-
ments concluded before the entry into force of 
Treaty of Rome were not to be affected by the 
same Treaty29. At the same time, they sought 
the adherence of EU’s objectives in the imple-
mentation of common commercial policy with 
the same aims and objectives as those pursued 
within the wto agreements30. Today, all EU’s 
members are also members to wto, along with 
the EU itself who also has full member status.
Differently, Mercosur is not. In 1991 the 
Treaty of Asunción was ratified as part of the 
process of convergence towards a common 
external tariff, to which followed in 1995 the 
same States’ individual membership to wto. 
Thus, the interest in regional agreements occurs 
against a backdrop of increased membership 
and substantive participation in the work of 
the gatt and now the wto.
The wto agreements recognize that under 
some circumstances regional trading arrange-
ments could hamper the trade interests of 
other countries. Normally, setting up a customs 
union or free trade area would violate the wto’s 
principle of equal treatment for all trading 
partners (“most-favoured-nation”), but gatt’s 
Article xxiv allows regional trading arrange-
ments to be set up as an exception, provided 
that special strict criteria are met. Article xxiv 
provides that when a free trade area or customs 
union is created, duties and other trade barriers 
have to be reduced or removed on substantially 
all sectors of trade in the group. Non-members 
should not find trade with the group any 
more restrictive than before the group was set 
up. Similarly, Article v of the General Agree-
ment on Trade in Services (‘gats’) provides for 
economic integration agreements in services. 
Other provisions in the wto agreements allow 
developing countries to enter into regional or 
global agreements that include the reduction or 
elimination of tariffs and non-tariff barriers on 
trade among themselves. On 6 February 1996, 
29 Today, art. 351 tfeu.
30 Today art. 206 tfeu.
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the wto General Council created the Regional 
Trade Agreements Committee. Its purpose is to 
examine regional groups and to assess whether 
they are consistent with wto rules. The com-
mittee also examines how regional arrange-
ments might affect the multilateral trading 
system, and what the relationship between 
regional and multilateral arrangements might 
be (World Trade Organization, 2016). 
In the light of what above, the institu-
tional setting in which the EU-Mercosur fta 
unfolds is the following. Two international 
organizations, composed by States, are ne-
gotiating a trade agreement outside wto 
framework but under the supervision of the 
Regional Trade Agreements Committee of 
this very organization. All member States 
of both the EU and Mercosur are parties to 
wto, the EU is also a member but Mercosur 
is not. Nevertheless, its members’ membership 
makes Mercosur bound, at least indirectly, to 
wto obligations and, possibly, constraints. 
Indeed, it is worth recalling that wto negotia-
tions (the s.c. “Doha round”) have been stuck 
since 2008. This could represent a boost to 
EU-Mercosur bilateral negotiations but, in-
stead, the absence of a genuine consensus on 
the need for an fta proved to be decisive in 
the failure of the first stage of EU-Mercosur 
negotiations (Robles, 2008). Simply put, the 
EU was protectionist in agriculture, while 
Mercosur was protectionist in foreign direct 
investment and in the manufacturing industry 
(Chaire Mercosur de Sciences Po, 2005). This 
can explain, on the Mercosur side, the growing 
influence of China and US in the region; on 
the contrary, the same influences add a sense 
of urgency on the EU side, due to the need 
to counteract them and secure preferential 
market access to EU’s companies.
In this complex panorama, the paper 
chooses to highlight two challenges, considered 
as encompassing, or at least touching upon, the 
many institutional hinders that the EU and 
Mercosur face in the fta negotiation process. 
Firstly, the non-State nature of both actors 
is highlighted, due to the added complexity 
it implies in reaching consensus among the 
parties and, secondly, the paper argues that 
increased participation of the agreement’s 
recipients, i.e. citizens of the relevant States, 
could boost the process, which currently suf-
fers from prolonged stagnation.
lack of statehood
The institutional structure of both the EU and 
Mercosur might appear as one of the reasons 
why none of the desired agreements (the iaa 
and the fta) has been concluded so far, and 
for the failure to reach today any binding draft 
of the negotiated texts.
Two fundamentally different approaches 
shaped both organizations’ integration process, 
with different outcomes: neofunctionalism 
and intergovernmentalism. Neofunctionalism 
is based on the theory of functionalism, which 
refers to the shift of power to resolve problems 
from the sovereign States to international bod-
ies (Chin Hong, 2010). Neofunctionalist31 
31 Ibid.
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scholars also call for the development of of-
ficial supranational organizations that acquire 
and exercise the partial sovereignty transferred 
by its member States. Intergovernmentalism 
provides that power in an international orga-
nization is possessed by member States and 
that decisions are unanimous. In other words, 
any exercise of power at a supranational level 
results from a direct decision by governments. 
The EU’s acquis developed in the balance of 
the two principles, while Mercosur’s present 
structure is explicitly intergovernmental, as no 
transfer of sovereignty has taken place. Thus, 
in combination with the presidential political 
system of its member States, Mercosur follows 
a strict model of top-down integration.
From an EU perspective, it has been pre-
viously highlighted that a Council mandate32 
is necessary in order to begin negotiations and 
that the mandate itself is drafted in rather strin-
gent terms, to which the negotiator must stick. 
Through the prism of intergovernmentalism, 
the pivotal role of member States’ governments 
becomes evident. Given the rigid division of 
competences, another aspect of EU’s ‘way 
of ftas’ can be questioned: whether clauses 
on cultural, political or other types of non-
commercial cooperation are included in trade 
agreements deliberately, in order to justify the 
participation of member States (Baratta, 2014). 
States’ interests in some sectors are safe-
guarded in the framework of an fta also by 
way of different procedural requirements (una-
nimity vote) with reference to specific sectors 
such, for instance, intellectual property33. In 
this respect, the disparities generated by the 
different impact of the same agreement into 
the economies of single member States as well 
as in their legal orders, by means of different 
implementation processes, might create ten-
sion. This is particularly true with reference 
to Mercosur’s States: despite its being an in-
ternational organization, founding members 
did not transfer any part of their sovereignty 
to Mercosur institutions. Consequently, its 
institutions have no supranational authority. 
The Council of the Common Market, the 
Common Market Group and the Trade Com-
mission are of an intergovernmental nature, as 
they are composed of representatives of each 
member and decisions are taken by consensus. 
Owing to the lack of supranational author-
ity, the negotiation and conclusion of treaties 
require the participation of all members and 
each member State follows its own rules for 
ratification and incorporation of international 
law. In other words, agreements entered into 
by Mercosur are not directly applicable in its 
members’ legal orders; they require approval or 
ratification at the national level by each State34. 
32 Council Decision of 22 March 1999 concerning the conclusion, on behalf of the European Community, of the 
interregional framework cooperation agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the 
one part, and the Southern Common Market and its Party States, of the other part. OJ L 112, 29.4.1999, p. 65–84.
33 Article 207, par. 4, tfeu.
34  More specifically, the Protocol of Ouro Preto states that “El Protocolo de Ouro Preto establece en el artículo 40 
un procedimiento que consta de tres etapas para la aplicación interna de las normas: 1. Una vez aprobada la norma, 
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This challenge regards EU’s member 
States as well, with reference to treaties con-
cluded under the ‘mixity regime’: the parts 
concluded in the exercise of EU’s exclusive 
competences are directly applicable in EU’s 
and member States’ legal orders, absent any 
domestic activity of implementation, because 
they are considered as directly applicable35. 
Differently, the parts concluded by the mem-
ber States in the exercise of their competence 
are to be subject to national implementation 
procedures. These procedures vary greatly in 
the today 28 member States and are likely to 
lead to different legal outcomes in the domestic 
legal orders.
Usually, an institutionalized framework 
of working groups and committees ensures 
implementation of ftas concluded by the EU 
by monitoring their proper execution. In ad-
dition, a dispute settlement mechanism (‘dsm’) 
is usually provided for dealing with disputes 
among the parties. In the case of EU-Korea 
fta36, the latter has been considered the ‘most 
substantial breakthrough’ (EU Parliament, 
2010) in the agreement. 
dsms are often inspired by the wto dis-
pute settlement model, providing for manda-
tory consultation, preference for mutually 
agreed solutions, possibility to resort to arbi-
tral panels and an Appellate Body, temporary 
remedies in cases of noncompliance including 
the temporarily revert of most favored nation 
tariffs and arbitral review of compliance mea-
sures. Hearing of arbitration panels are open 
to public and submission of briefs by amicus 
curiae are possible. Under the EU-Korea fta, 
social and environmental clauses are also sub-
ject to a panel arbitration, but the rulings are 
not binding in this case.
At the last EU-Mercosur negotiating 
round, the parties examined the issue of insert-
ing a dsm in the framework of the fta. The 
only disclosed document as this regard states 
as follows: “Discussions on dsm advanced at a 
los Estados Partes adoptarán las medidas necesarias para su incorporación al ordenamiento jurídico nacional y comu-
nicarán las mismas a la Secretaría Administrativa del Mercosur;
2. Cuando todos los Estados Partes hubieren informado la incorporación a sus respectivos ordenamientos jurídicos 
internos, la Secretaría Administrativa del Mercosur comunicará el hecho a cada Estado Parte;
3. Las normas entrarán en vigor simultáneamente en los Estados Partes 30 días después de la fecha de comunicación 
efectuada por la Secretaría Administrativa del Mercosur, en los términos del literal anterior. Con ese objetivo, los 
Estados Partes. Dentro del plazo mencionado, darán publicidad del inicio de la vigencia de las referidas normas, por 
intermedio de sus respectivos diarios oficiales”. (art. 40).
35 Article 216, par. 1 tfue states that ‘Agreements concluded by the Union are binding upon the institutions of the 
Union and on its Member States’.
36  2011/265/EU: Council Decision of 16 September 2010 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, and 
provisional application of the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one 
part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part Commission’s statements. Free trade Agreement between the Euro-
pean Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part; Protocol concerning 
the definition of ‘originating products’ and methods of administrative cooperation; Protocol on mutual administrative 
assistance in customs matters; Protocol on cultural cooperation. OJ L 127, 14.5.2011, pp. 1-1426.
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considerable pace and the two sides came closer 
in a considerable number of issues. All aspects 
were covered at this round, and progress was 
made in the main text and the annexes (rules 
of procedure, code of conduct and mediation). 
The Code of Conduct is now agreed. A limited 
number of difficult issues remain open”37. It is 
obvious that the statement is, as such, not tell-
ing about actual intentions of the parties in this 
regard and, absent any substantial clue, one may 
question if the consensus on the topic has been 
reached at all so far. Alternatively, it is also pos-
sible to imagine that the released document is 
deliberately silent on the dsm’s nature and pur-
pose, due to the major critiques that the same 
mechanism received with reference to other ftas.
lack of transparency and scarcity 
of civil society involvement 
Foreign affairs are inherently characterized by 
a democratic deficit, due to their very nature 
and the magnitude of involved interests, often 
relating to matters of State security. Therefore, 
the limited involvement of institutions usually 
pivotal in law making, such Parliaments, comes 
as no surprise. This is even more true vis a vis 
international organizations who are by defini-
tion participated by representatives of States 
as such. Furthermore, ftas endorse interests 
that even if deemed to relapse (positively or 
negatively) on civil society are separated from 
citizens by so many institutional layers that 
their participation cannot be other that scarce.
In EU’s experience, ttip negotiations-
38showed that there is an ongoing quest for 
people’s involvement, also in treaty-making: 
a petition to the Ombudsperson39 was suc-
cessfully filed to the purpose of having the 
relevant drafts and document disclosed. Due 
to the lack of other case studies, the release 
of several documents in ttip case cannot be 
regarded as a game changer. With regard to 
the EU-Mercosur’s fta, negotiations are not 
at a substantial stage and not binding com-
mitments are in place among the parties yet. 
Movements who oppose the conclusion 
of the agreement are numerous in both re-
gions, though. Their main critiques revolve 
around the consequence of liberalization, on 
the agricultural industry in the EU40 and on 
37 Report from the xxviiith round of negotiations Of the Trade Part of the Association Agreement between the 
European Union and Mercosur Brussels, 3-7 July 2017. The previous report on the meeting that had took place 
between 10 and 14 October 2016 stated “The Parties discussed the consolidated text on Dispute Settlement, includ-
ing proposals for changes to update the text in light of recent ftas. Discussions covered most provisions including 
on complicated issues such as open hearings and cross-retaliation in order to identify areas of potential convergence. 
Further discussions will take place on issues such as amicus briefs, mediation and nullification and impairment”.
38 Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, negotiated between the EU and the US.
39 Decision of the European Ombudsman closing the inquiry into complaint 119/2015/php on the European 
Commission’s handling of a request for public access to documents related to ttip. Opened on 18 Feb 2015 - Deci-
sion on 04 Nov 2015.
40  For agricultural products, there is considerable imbalance in the trade flows between the two regional blocs. From 
an EU perspective, there is a negative trade balance with Mercosur for agricultural products of roughly €7.8 billion. 
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the manufacturing sector in Mercosur region 
(Robles, 2008): the economic efficiency of 
the fta in both parties’ systems is perhaps 
shadowed by its political discomfort. As high-
lighted previously, the institutional apparatus 
in which negotiations unfold is extremely 
complex and comprises many stakeholders, 
whose thick consensus (Pauwelyn, Wessel & 
Wouters, 2012) largely over weights civil so-
ciety’s mobilization. 
From an EU perspective, the increased 
participation of the Parliament in treaty mak-
ing offers to persons (legal, natural or groups) 
an opportunity to get indirectly involved in 
the decision-making process, through the 
representation of their own interests. They can 
also participate in the Commission’s activities 
in the early preparatory phase of discussion 
about launching trade negotiations, when 
the Commission holds public consultations 
with civil society. From a Mercosur’s one, the 
Protocol of Ouro Preto introduced the possi-
bility of private parties to submit complaints 
to the Trade Commission. The Commission 
considers complaints whenever the cause of 
the complaint concerns a matter within its 
competence. The Commission’s mandate is to 
monitor the application of the common trade 
policy instruments and this can represent an 
ex post monitoring instruments. Some authors 
pointed out that, with the limited role granted 
to the Parliament and its lack of decision-
making powers, it is clear that mercosur’s in-
stitutional system “debe ser interpretado como 
defensor del interés de los países signatarios 
por mantener una amplia libertad de acción y 
sin someterse a una injerencia por encima de 
las esferas gubernamentales” (Ensinck, 2008). 
In the light of this, one may assess a limited 
involvement of citizens in the process of draft-
ing the fta and this ultimately might lead to 
opposition toward its enactment in fact.
Obviously, both parties’ nationals have 
also the opportunity for lobbying and/or the 
entitlement to legal protection provided for 
under their national laws.
With specific reference to dsms mecha-
nisms, they might have different natures. The 
solution provided for in ttip was subject to 
severe criticisms, mostly relating to the issue 
of having foreign investors challenging na-
tional regulations before a panel, which was 
not appointed by a democratically-legitimate 
and transparent procedure. EU-Mercosur fta, 
instead, does not include rebus sic stantibus any 
provision relating to investment but focuses 
on market access and removal of technical 
barriers to trade: earlier exchanged proposals 
mentioned such a chapter but when negotia-
tion was resorted after the long pause, the issue 
is no longer considered by documents acces-
sible to the public. Conversely, trade has been 
subject to multilateral rules negotiated and 
implemented within the auspices of wto and 
backed up by the mentioned dispute settle-
ment system.
It currently provides a market for 1.7% of EU agricultural exports, while 16% of EU agricultural imports stem from 
the Mercosur group. See A. Schneider, The EU-Mercosur Free Trade Agreement The Implications for Trade in Agri-
culture, ceps Policy Brief, 107/June 2006.
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Nevertheless, it seems that EU decision-
makers and negotiators are aware of the sensi-
tive nature of the topic, because in the only dis-
closed factsheet relating to the possible incorpo-
ration of dsm in EU-Mercosur fta reveals the 
intention to ‘including proposals for changes to 
update the text in light of recent ftas’.
The reference is very likely to the ttip 
saga but, in this case, due to the different object 
of the treaty, it is possible to question the neces-
sity of such a proviso. The EU and Mercosur’s 
countries would not lose the possibility to have 
disputes arising out the interpretation and/
or application of their fta settled by ordinary 
means available under wto law. Of course, 
wto system does not go without criticism 
as well but, from a strategic perspective, the 
dereliction of dsm proviso in the negotiation 
agenda could help in smoothing at least some 
of the opponents’ arguments.
Finally, from an EU perspective, other 
remedies41 are available for enforcement of trade 
agreements with third States and in this sense, 
the necessity of negotiating a complex and some-
how uneasy dsm might lose momentum.
conclusIon
The paper suggests that an EU-Mercosur 
agreement could bring benefits for both the 
EU and Mercosur in terms of economic 
growth42. However, it also highlights a num-
ber of concerns, which have been examined 
through the prisms of institutional setting of 
both actors and scarcity of civil society involve-
ment, in relation to the agreement’s potentially 
significant adverse impact on both actors’ most 
sensitive industries. The paper also notes that, 
while beneficial spillovers could be expected 
in many different fields, only a balanced and 
ambitious agreement, taking into account 
economic, social and environmental impacts, 
has the potential to bring maximum benefits 
to both partners and be conducive to sustain-
able development. 
From the perspective of the two bloc’s na-
ture and institutional settings, two shortcomings 
have been identified: on the one hand, the hyper-
complexity of decision-making and the necessary 
presence of a multitude of governmental actors 
make the negotiations particularly time and ef-
fort consuming. On the other hand, in order to 
have an efficient agreement in place, especially 
one implying major societal reforms in different 
sectors, it is advisable that stakeholders from civil 
society are properly involved in early stages of 
negotiations. While these assumptions might 
seem to contrast one to another. Conversely they 
are of mutual support: in this vein, the shift from 
a governmental-based approach towards a more 
41 Regulation (EU) No 654/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 concerning the 
exercise of the Union’s rights for the application and enforcement of international trade rules and amending Council 
Regulation (EC) No 3286/94 laying down Community procedures in the field of the common commercial policy in 
order to ensure the exercise of the Community’s rights under international trade rules, in particular those established 
under the auspices of the World Trade Organization. OJ L 189, 27 June 2014.
42 For economic analysis and related figures, refer to A. Burrell, E. Ferrari, A. González Mellado, M. Himics, J. Mi-
chalek, S. Shrestha and B. Van Doorslaer, Potential EU-Mercosur Free Trade Agreement: Impact Assessment, 2011, 
available at http://ipts.jrc.ec.europa.eu/.
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democratically legitimate process might be the 
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